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Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between the proportion of cases resolved by plea in the 
federal court circuits and the median sentence length of those circuits. Through OLS regression, this 
study models the relationship, controlling for variation in circuits, year, and violent crime proportion. 
With an understanding of two common theoretical frameworks surrounding the trial tax discussion, this 
study theorized under a focal concerns perspective that as the proportion of cases resolved by plea in a 
circuit increases, the median sentence length of that circuit would decrease. The results of this study are 
consistent with results of prior research showing the existence of a trial tax. Additionally, this study 
investigates the relationship between the caseload of a circuit and the proportion of cases resolved by 
plea in a circuit to understand the extent to which caseload influences plea bargaining practices in a 
circuit. The results of this analysis suggest that caseload differences have little influence on plea 
proportions when the caseloads are below one hundred. However, caseloads larger than this do tend to 
be correlated with high plea proportions, supporting the focal concerns theory prediction of increased 
plea pressure in high caseload courts. Overall, this study provides evidence of a macro level trial tax that 
is consistent with individual level findings.  
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I. Introduction 
The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution reads “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial.” (United States Constitution, 1789). The founding fathers deemed 
this right imperative for due process. However, in today’s justice system, less than 10% of criminal 
defendants assert this right (Kim, 2015; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). The other 90-95% of criminal 
defendants resolve their cases through plea bargains (Johnson, 2019). Plea bargaining is an ongoing 
process that generally begins when the defendant is formally charged and continues up until trial. In this 
process, the prosecutor offers to lessen the charge or present specific sentence recommendations to 
the judge in return for the defendant accepting a guilty plea or nolo contendere plea (Guidorizzi, 1998; 
Johnson, 2019; Ulmer, Eisenstein, & Johnson, 2010). This process is heavily relied on in the American 
criminal justice system because it helps balance the Crime Control and Due Process models of justice.  
The differences in these two models lies in their primary goals. The Crime Control model of justice 
prioritizes crime suppression and efficiency in case disposition (Packer, 1963). A justice system built 
solely on this interest would process cases quickly with little regard for defendant’s due process rights, 
resulting in few guilty people going unpunished but a greater likelihood of innocent defendants being 
convicted (Packer, 1963). Conversely, the Due Process model prioritizes the rights of the defendants 
(Packer, 1963). A justice system based solely on this interest would process cases slowly with great 
scrutiny, minimizing the probability of an innocent defendant being wrongly adjudicated and punished 
but increasing the probability that a guilty defendant avoids conviction (Packer, 1963). Therefore, a 
justice system that emphasizes fair treatment of defendants and protecting the community from crime 
must balance these two models and their components (Packer, 1963). Plea bargaining is one successful 
mechanism for doing so.  
Plea bargaining allows cases to be dealt with efficiently, requiring less time and fewer resources 
than trials (Guidorizzi, 1998; Johnson, 2019). Thus, it increases the efficiency of the justice system. 
Additionally, plea bargaining is optional. A defendant must knowingly and willingly relinquish their due 
process rights to trial and to confront the witnesses against them (Guidorizzi, 1998). Hence, 
theoretically, plea bargaining still values and respects the due process rights of criminal defendants. Due 
to large caseloads, limited resources, and plea bargaining’s ability to improve efficiency without violating 
individual’s rights, there is a heavy reliance on plea bargaining at all levels of the American criminal 
justice system (Johnson, 2019). This heavy reliance warrants a critical examination of the plea-
bargaining process and its effects to make sure that it is in fact being used fairly and not infringing on 
defendant’s rights. 
Prior research suggests that empirically, plea bargaining may not be striking the balance it 
theoretically should. Some scholars suggest that plea bargaining is used disproportionately against the 
poor, who are less able to devote time and resources to their case processing (Hall, 1999). Other studies 
suggest that defendants who opt for trial rather than resolve their cases through plea receive harsher 
punishments (Bradley-Engen , Engen , Shields , Damphousse & Smith ,2012; Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 
2014; Kim, 2015; Johnson, 2003; Johnson, 2006; Spohn, 1992; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et. al, 2010, 
Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). This phenomenon, often called the “trial tax” or “trial penalty”, is controversial 
in the legal and criminal justice fields (Guidorizzi, 1998; Johnson, 2019; Ulmer et. al, 2010). Some argue 
that a trial tax is necessary. In order to discourage individuals from taking their case to trial and using 
valuable system resources, there must be a threat of greater punishment for doing so (Steffensmeier, 
Kramer & Ulmer, 1998; Ulmer et. al, 2010). Otherwise, everyone would assert their right to trial, and the 
issues of backlog and scarce resources already faced by the criminal justice system would be 
exacerbated. Meanwhile, others argue that it is less of a “trial tax” than a “plea discount” (Bushway et 
al., 2014; Johnson, 2019). However, either way one chooses to look at it, evidence suggests that those 
who opt to go to trial are often receiving harsher punishments than those who agree to plead guilty 
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(Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Bushway et al. 2014; Kim, 2015; Johnson, 2003; Johnson, 2006; Spohn, 
1992; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et. al, 2010, Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Therefore, the existence of a 
“trial tax/plea discount” means that defendants are penalized for asserting their Constitutional right to 
trial.  
This study investigates the existence of a trial tax on a macro level. Using federal sentencing data 
from the United States Sentencing Commission, this study analyzes the relationship between the 
median sentence length of the federal courts in the U.S. Circuits (excluding the District of Columbia 
Circuit) and the proportion of cases resolved by plea in those circuits. If a trial tax does exist, circuit 
courts that have a lower proportion of cases resolved by plea should have a higher median sentence 
length. Conversely, circuit courts with a higher proportion of cases resolved by plea should have a lower 
median sentence length if a trial tax exists. This study identifies a nonlinear model that explains the 
relationship between plea bargaining and sentencing length at a macro level while controlling for other 
variables. Evidence of a trial tax is found.  
 
II. Conditional or Unconditional 
 
In addition to the trial tax’s potential impact on a Constitutional right, it has been controversial 
because there is conflicting evidence on its existence. Many studies have shown that trial convictions 
tend to result in harsher punishments—either in the sanction itself (Johnson, 2006; Spohn, 1992; Ulmer 
& Bradley, 2006) or in its duration (Bushway et al., 2014; Engen et al., 2012; Johnson, 2006; Kim, 2015; 
Spohn, 1992; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006)—than convictions by guilty or nolo contendere pleas. However, a 
couple prominent studies resulted in no evidence of a trial tax and even some evidence in support of a 
trial discount (Abrams, 2013; Breen, 2011; Breen & Johnson, 2018). While these differences in findings 
have created much controversy, a careful examination of the methods used in these studies reveals that 
these differences can be explained in terms of conditionality.  
Both types of studies essentially compare the expected sentence length for a defendant convicted 
by plea to a similar defendant convicted by trial to see if differences exist. However, one type of study 
uses the conditional expected value while one uses the unconditional expected value (Abrams, 2013). 
While these may seem the same on the surface, in reality they are not. For example, think about the 
expected number of heads when a coin is flipped ten times. Most people would say that the expected 
number of heads is five. However, if the coin being flipped was a coin with heads on both sides, the 
expected number of heads would increase to ten. This is the conditional expected value. The additional 
knowledge that the coin has heads on both sides changes the outcomes of the event. This same nuance 
is seen in trial tax research. 
Whether a researcher looks at the expected sentence length of those who have been convicted 
versus the whole population of defendants matters greatly. This is because a portion of the defendants 
who assert their right to trial will be acquitted (Abrams, 2013). Whether or not these defendants are 
included in the calculations turns out to be very important. In fact, most studies that exclude these 
defendants from their data sets find evidence of a trial tax, while those who include them tend to find 
no evidence of a trial tax (Abrams, 2013; Kim, 2015). The conditional and unconditional expected values 
for those who plead guilty are the same whether one looks at those convicted or the whole population 
of criminal defendants. This is because a guilty plea always results in a conviction. However, this is not 
the case for trial. The unconditional expected sentence length of a trial is the expected sentence length 
if convicted multiplied by the probability of conviction plus the expected sentence length if acquitted (0) 
multiplied by the probability of acquittal (Abrams, 2013)1. Since this average includes many zero values, 
 
1 The following equation calculates the unconditional expected sentence length where S represents the sentence 
length, p represents probability, and C represents convicted:  
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the resulting number will be much less than just the average sentence length of those convicted at trial. 
Hence, the conditional expected sentence length will always be greater than the unconditional expected 
sentence length for those who go to trial. Therefore, studies that use the unconditional expected 
sentence length find smaller differences between the expected sentence length of those who go to trial 
and those who plead guilty (Abrams, 2013; Breen, 2011). This results in less evidence of a trial tax in 
these studies. 
Controversy exists over which of these methods is appropriate due to their different conclusions on 
the trial tax. Overall, the appropriate method to use depends on the question of the researcher. For 
example, if the researcher is interested in whether going to trial or taking a plea deal results in a more 
favorable outcome, weighing the possibility of acquittal is important. Similarly, if they want to know if 
the average sentence length is different after accounting for the possibility of acquittal, they would want 
to include this information. However, when determining the existence of a trial tax, one should use the 
conditional expected values. This is what most researchers and legal scholars refer to when speaking of 
a trial tax (Kim, 2015; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). Further, by definition, the trial tax is 
the excess of punishment received by those who go to trial compared to those who plead guilty 
(Johnson, 2006; Kim, 2015; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer & Johnson, 2004). Including acquittals into 
this calculation would be like including the fact that any other citizen not involved with the criminal 
justice system has a sentence length of zero punishment. The presumption of innocence requires that 
no judgements be made about an individual and no actions taken against them until the State proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt that they are guilty (Anderson, Baradaran, Lopez, Perry, & Center, 2011; 
Kim, 2015). Including acquittal values of no punishment would violate this foundational principle (Kim, 
2015). In the eyes of the law, someone acquitted of their charges is no guiltier than someone who has 
never faced charges. Thus, in the eyes of the law, including their sentence length values of zero would 
be no different than including a sentence length value of zero for every other person not involved in the 
criminal justice system and then averaging. This would not result in any sort of meaningful value. Thus, 
the trial tax should use conditional expected sentence lengths rather than unconditional (Kim, 2015). 
Accordingly, this study uses the median sentence length in a circuit such that the median is calculated 
only upon the non-zero sentences handed out in that circuit.  
  
III. Theoretical Background 
 
Due to the controversy over the existence of the trial tax, two prominent theories have been used to 
explain the relationship between the sentences of those convicted at trial and those who pled guilty. 
One of these theories, the focal concerns perspective, focuses on how criminal judges make sentencing 
decisions (Steffensmeier et al., 1998), and this in turn, has been applied to explain the existence of a trial 
tax (Bradley-Engen, et al., 2012; Bushway et al., 2014; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). It argues that as a result 
of going to trial, a defendant is viewed more negatively by the sentencing judge (Ulmer, 1997; Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006). Hence, they receive a harsher punishment. On the contrary, the shadow of the law 
perspective explains why theoretically, a trial tax should not exist or in the least, should be a modest 
compensation for the odds of acquittal (Abrams, 2013; Bibas, 2004; Bushway et. al, 2014). Based upon 
an economic/rational actor theory, this perspective argues that ideally, both sides will only agree to a 
 
 𝐸(𝑆) = 𝐸(𝑆|𝐶) ∗ 𝑃(𝐶) + 0 ∗ 𝑃(𝐶𝑐). 
Compare this to the equation for the conditional expected sentence length where 𝑆𝑘  represents the sentence 








plea deal with a sentence equal to what they would expect if convicted at trial (Abrams, 2013; Bibas, 
2004; Kim, 2015) Therefore, the disparity in sentences for those convicted by trial and those who plea 
should be minimal (Abrams, 2013; Bibas, 2004). Thus, a significant trial tax should not be present. 
Understanding the different components of the theories will provide insight into their different 
conclusions on the existence of a trial tax.  
The focal concerns theory has three components: blameworthiness, practical considerations, and 
protection of the community (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). It argues that judges primarily consider these 
three components to predict future behavior and analyze the ‘just desert’ of the offender when 
sentencing an individual (Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Defendants who go to trial compared to those who 
plead guilty are likely perceived more negatively in respects to these components (Ulmer & Bradley, 
2006). Defendants convicted at trial may be perceived more negatively for a variety of reasons. One of 
these reasons is that defendants convicted at trial are viewed as less remorseful and less accepting of 
responsibility than those convicted by plea (Breen, 2011; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). If the defendant is 
convicted for a violent offense against a person, their blameworthiness further intensifies (Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006). This is because rather than saving the victim from the trauma of a trial and admitting to 
their crimes, the defendant forced them to relive it. Further, throughout the trial process the 
prosecution paints the defendant in the most negative light possible in order to secure a conviction 
(Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). “Bad facts” pertaining to the crime itself or to the defendant’s character may 
come out during trial. These “bad facts” increase the culpability of the defendant, resulting in the judges 
imposing harsher sentences (Ulmer &Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). The same is not true for 
convictions by plea deal. In a majority of the plea deals, the sentencing judge typically imposes the 
sentence the prosecutor recommends in the plea deal (Ulmer et al., 2010). Most often, the judge knows 
much less information about the case or the defendant if they are only presented with a plea deal than 
they would following a trial (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). 
While some may argue that this means the judge would not know any mitigating circumstances and thus 
result in greater perceived blameworthiness, the structure of a trial creates a situation in which 
aggravating circumstances are more highly emphasized and dramatized than mitigating circumstances 
(Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). Some evidence has been found 
supporting this component of the theory in a study using qualitative survey data from judges and 
attorneys (Ulmer et al., 2010). 
The practical constraint component of the focal concerns theory is closely related to the issue with 
the Due Process Model of justice—organizational efficiency. As mentioned earlier, the American 
criminal justice system has an impossible caseload. Thus, it helps to process cases efficiently and prevent 
a backlog if judges either impose harsher penalties for those who go to trial or impose less severe 
penalties to those who plead guilty (Dixon, 1995; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). By doing this judges 
encourage the use of plea deals to resolve cases and save the time and resources for more legitimate 
trials (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). Accordingly, the more illegitimate a trial is seen to be, the harsher the 
punishment that will be imposed for it (Ulmer et al., 2010). Another practical constraint that affects how 
the judge sentences is the fact that defense attorneys, judges, and prosecutors are all a part of the same 
workgroup. Since trials put the members of the workgroup against each other and force the judge to 
mediate, they are viewed as unpleasant and disruptive (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Ulmer & Bradley, 
2006). As a result of this, penalties are given to those who opt for trial in order to discourage such 
experiences (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012). Findings that caseload and opting for a trial over a guilty plea 
interact to increase sentence length in the federal district court system suggest that this theory has 
merit (Ulmer et. al, 2010). 
 The last component of the focal concerns perspective is protection of the community 
(Steffensmier et al., 1998). Similar to the blameworthiness component, a trial will unearth aggravating 
factors like a defendant’s criminal history that a plea deal would not unearth (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; 
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Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). This factor may negatively affect the way the judge 
perceives the defendant and the threat they pose to society. Thus, this may result in harsher sentences. 
Additionally, trials generate more publicity than a plea deal (Brereton & Casper, 1981). Due to this, there 
is increased pressure on the judge to emphasize their interest in community protection (Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006). In order to do so, the judge may give a sentence longer than the one they would 
otherwise impose (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006).   
 While applying the focal concerns theory to the concept of a trial tax argues that going to trial 
changes the judge’s perception of the defendant and this altered perception results in more severe 
punishments, the shadow of the law theory2 argues that theoretically the difference in the sentence 
lengths of those who go to trial and those who plead guilty should be slight or nonexistent (Abrams, 
2013). This theory has its roots in economic and rational actor theory. It argues that reasonably, the 
defense will only accept plea offers if they are less than or equal to the sentence the defendant would 
expect from trial (Abrams, 2013; Bushway et al., 2014). On the other side, the prosecutor will only offer 
pleas that carry a sentence greater than or equal to what they expect as the outcome of a trial after 
accounting for the probability of acquittal (Abrams, 2013; Bibas, 2004; Bushway et al., 2014). Thus, the 
expected plea sentence would be about equal to the expected trial sentence since that is the small 
range the defense and prosecutors agree upon (Abrams, 2013). Theoretically, this theory suggests that 
the trial tax should be minimal if even existent. In reality, there is great variation in this. This is because 
not all cases are the same. Some cases lack convincing physical evidence or strong witnesses. Thus, the 
prosecutor may be more willing to decrease the plea sentence length in order to guarantee a conviction 
they otherwise could not secure (Bibas, 2004). Further, not all court actors act solely based upon logic. 
For example, a risk averse defendant and risk averse court actors will favor the certainty that a plea deal 
offers compared to a trial (Bibas, 2004; Bushway et al., 2014). Due to their inclination towards certainty, 
the defendant may be more willing to accept a plea sentence longer than what they would expect from 
trial in order to have assurance in their sentence and a quick resolution of their case (Bushway et al., 
2014). 3 This could potentially result in a negative trial tax.4 Further, this theory is based on human 
perception—something that can vary greatly depending on other factors. For example, a young attorney 
will have less of an idea of the expected outcome of a given case if it goes to trial than an experienced 
attorney who has had many similar cases in the past. Additionally, if the presiding judge has been on the 
bench for many years, both sides will be better able to estimate the outcome of the trial and the 
resulting sentence than if the judge has presided over few cases (Abrams, 2013). Factors like these may 
affect one or both sides perceived expected value, affecting the sentence lengths they would agree to in 
plea deals.  
 These two prominent theories provide different views on a trial tax. The focal concerns 
application argues that going to trial may carry negative consequences for the defendant’s image and 
for the court’s efficiency, resulting in harsher punishments (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Breen, 2011; 
Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). The shadow of the law perspective argues that plea deals 
only happen when the two sides agree on the expected outcome of trial and that outcome is what is 
 
2 This theory is also commonly referred to as the bargaining in the shadow of the trial theory. 
3 This factor presents another potential issue with plea bargaining that should be explored. Studies show that 
criminal offenders tend to be much less risk averse than their non-offending counterparts, with some studies even 
showing a tendency for risk seeking among this population (Kim, 2015). Thus, guilty defendants would tend to be 
much more likely to risk trial than innocent defendants. Due to innocent defendant’s tendency to avoid risk, they 
will feel increased pressure to plead guilty despite their innocence. Therefore, this factor of risk aversion and its 
effect on plea bargaining decisions could create a due process issue in which innocent people are wrongly 
convicted (Bibas, 2004; Kim, 2015). Further research should investigate this potential relationship.  
4 This variation on the shadow of the law theory often is referred to as a distinct theory called the uncertainty 
avoidance theory. For further elaboration see (Breen, 2011; Albonetti, 1986; Albonetti, 1987). 
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stipulated to in the plea deal (Abrams, 2013; Bibas, 2004; Bushway et al., 2012). The former explains the 
existence of a trial tax while the latter explains why a trial tax should be minimal, especially if using 
unconditional expected values for comparison. As stated above, there is potential variation in the latter 
theory and its predictions regarding a trial tax based upon whether risk aversion is taken into account 
and the characteristics of the court actors (Breen, 2011; Bushway et al., 2014). The findings of this study 
show the existence of a significant negative nonlinear relationship between the proportion of cases 
resolved by plea in a circuit and the median sentence length for that circuit. Overall, the findings support 
the existence of a significant trial tax on a macro level in the federal U.S. circuit Courts. Thus, these 
results provide support for the focal concerns theory over the conventional shadow of a trial theory. 
However, alterations of the shadow of a trial theory including potential differences in courtroom actor 
experience between circuits could be supported by this findings as well.  
 
IV. Trial Tax Research 
 
An abundance of literature exists suggesting that defendants who assert their rights to trial face 
harsher punishments than those who plead guilty (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Bushway et al., 2014;  
Johnson, 2006; Kim, 2015; Spohn, 1992; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Ulmer & Bradley, 2010; Ulmer & 
Johnson, 2004; Ulmer et. al, 2006). One common measure of a trial tax is the difference in likelihood of 
incarceration between those convicted at trial and those who pled guilty. Studies estimate that those 
convicted by trial are two to three times more likely to be imprisoned than those convicted by plea 
(Johnson, 2006; Steffensmeier et al., 1998). The other measure of trial tax commonly used is the 
difference between the lengths of the sentences between the two modes of conviction. Estimates for 
this trial tax vary greatly with some studies suggesting differences of a few months between the two 
modes of conviction while other studies suggest that a defendant asserting their right to trial could 
increase their incarceration sentence by years (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Johnson, 2006; Spohn, 1992; 
Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). Overall, a review of the research suggests the existence of a trial tax.  
The size of the trial tax observed is not consistent. Research suggests that the trial tax may vary from 
court to court (Breen, 2011; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010) and from offender to offender 
(Spohn, 1992; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). Depending on the characteristics of the 
offender (Spohn, 1992), the nature of the convicted offense, and the characteristics of the courts 
studied, the trial tax may fluctuate (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). As mentioned earlier, 
the size and direction of the trial tax also varies by the method of the study depending on the inclusion 
or exclusion of acquittal data. While studies excluding acquittal data provide the most accurate measure 
of a trial tax, the studies including acquittal data still contribute to the discussion of the trial tax in their 
identification of control variables and investigation into other previously unstudied characteristics. Thus, 
the following review of the trial tax literature will include both conditional and unconditional studies.  
Throughout the criminal justice system, defendants vary greatly in their characteristics. From race to 
gender to criminal history, defendants have a variety of attributes that differentiate them from other 
defendants. Differences in these attributes may affect the trial tax imposed. While many studies suggest 
that race does not significantly impact the trial tax of a given court or set of courts (Breen, 2011; Spohn, 
1992; Ulmer et. al, 20016), others suggest that African American defendants face a greater trial tax than 
their white counterparts (Johnson, 2003; Ulmer 1997). Similarly, conflicting evidence exists as to 
whether being male increases the trial tax imposed upon a defendant (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Breen, 
2011). While the literature generally suggests that there is a significant difference in the punishment 
imposed based upon these characteristics, it provides no evidence that these characteristics further 
interact with the mode of conviction variable (Spohn, 1992; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). 
One variable that the research suggests may interact with the mode of conviction variable is the criminal 
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history of a defendant. However, the direction of this interaction is not clear. Ulmer’s early study 
suggested a positive interaction effect between the criminal history of a defendant and the trial tax 
imposed (1997), while the subsequent study done by Ulmer & Bradley suggested the opposite—a 
negative interaction effect (2006). This characteristic along with gender and race appear to be important 
in their direct effects on sentence length, but with conflicting evidence from different studies, the 
interaction effects of individual defendant characteristics are not well understood. As findings vary from 
study to study, more individual level research is needed to understand these variables. While this study 
does not expand on these variables because it is a macro level study rather than individual level study, 
future research could include aggregate macro level measures of these variables for analysis as well.  
Just as differences in offender characteristics have been investigated in the context of the trial tax, 
differences in the nature of the convicted offense have also been analyzed. This analysis has taken two 
different forms. While one looks broadly at offense severity (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al, 2010), the other looks specifically at offense type (Breen, 2011; Kim, 2015; 
Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). The measures of the variables themselves also take on many different form. For 
example, offense severity could be measured by the harm caused to the victim (Bradley-Engen et al., 
2012; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006) or the guideline recommended sentence length for that offense (Ulmer et 
al., 2010). Likewise, offense type can be measured by general person versus property offense categories 
(Breen, 2011) or more specific offense categories (Kim, 2015; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). In their 2006 
study, Ulmer et al. looked specifically at serious violent offenses defined as “third degree murder, 
aggravated assault, rape, involuntary deviant sexual intercourse, and robbery”, finding that the trial tax 
still existed within this set of offenses. Regarding interaction effects for the nature of the offense, 
studies have shown that the trial penalty varies by offense type. Studies suggest more severe offenses 
result in harsher punishments (incarceration versus no incarceration) for those who opt for jury trial 
versus those who plead guilty (Breen, 2011; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). However, when the term trial tax is 
used to refer to differences in lengths of incarceration between the two modes of conviction, there are 
mixed results for the interaction effect between offense severity and the trial tax (Kim, 2015; Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). Based upon this prior research, this study will control for the nature 
of the offenses in a given circuit by including a proportion of violent crime variable. However, it will not 
investigate an interaction effect.  
Trial tax research has examined a variety of courts from state to federal to military courts. Although 
the criminal justice system attempts to be as uniform and consistent as possible, large variations exist 
from court to court and circuit to circuit. Courts vary in individual characteristics such as caseload, 
location, and the primary types of crime dealt with in that court (see United States Sentencing 
Commission Federal Sentencing Data). Additionally, there are different court systems. To name a few, 
there are county courts, municipal courts, federal courts, and military courts. The county and municipal 
courts belong to the state court system while the federal and military courts each belong to their own 
court system (Breen, 2011; Glick, 1983). While these court systems share many characteristics, there are 
distinctions between them in their jurisdiction and structure. Prior research suggests that trial tax varies 
depending upon these types of variations in court characteristics. 
Regarding individual characteristics, different courts vary greatly. For example, in 2017 the federal 
district courts in the first circuit handled 1993 cases, while the federal courts in the ninth circuit handled 
13,122 cases (United States Sentencing Commission “2017 Federal Sentencing Statistics” [USSC]). This is 
because the ninth circuit consists of a much greater population than the first circuit. These differences in 
the number of cases per year are somewhat remedied by the increased number of judges in the ninth 
federal circuit. In fact, a standardized measure of caseload per judge has been created by taking the 
number of cases in a given court district divided by the number of judgeships in that district. Calculating 
this for the given example, there are still vast differences between the two circuits. The ninth circuit 
federal judges manage a caseload of 117 cases per year while the first circuit federal judges handle a 
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caseload of only 69 cases per year. These differences carry importance when it comes to analyzing the 
relationship between mode of conviction and sentence length. Some studies show a positive interaction 
effect between the trial tax and the caseload of a given court (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 
2010). In other words, as a court’s caseload increases, the difference between the sentence lengths of 
those convicted by trial and those convicted by plea tends to increase. These findings lend support to 
the focal concerns theory, specifically to its practical constraints component. Additionally, some courts 
have greater trial rates than others. Ulmer et. al found this characteristic conversely affects the trial tax 
(2010). In fact, one extra trial per judge was associated with a .004 decrease on the trial tax coefficient 
(p<.05) (Ulmer 2010). Thus, these individual characteristics can have a large effect on the observed trial 
tax in that court.  
In addition to differences in caseload and trial rates, some courts are distinct in nature from other 
courts. For example, while most research on trial tax focuses on civilian courts, some research has 
extended into military courts (Breen, 2011; Breen & Johnson, 2018). The military court system differs 
from the civilian court system in structure, punishments, caseloads, trial rates, and many other factors 
(Breen, 2011). One of these main factors is that the military court system allows for sentencing done by 
a jury. Few states allow this, and even fewer allow for jury sentencing following a guilty plea (Breen, 
2011). Mixed research surrounds this type of sentencing with some evidence suggesting jurors to be 
more lenient than judges and other evidence suggesting the contrary (Breen, 2011). However, 
concerning this type of sentencing’s effect on trial tax, Breen (2011) found no difference in the 
sentences for those convicted at trial versus those convicted by guilty plea whether they were 
sentenced by a judge or a jury (Breen & Johnson, 2018).5  
While most of the research suggesting evidence of a trial tax is done on state courts (Bushway et al., 
2014; Johnson, 2003; Johnson, 2006; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006), a few researchers have looked specifically 
at federal courts to understand how the trial tax there differs from their more commonly studied state 
counterparts (Kim, 2015; Ulmer et al., 2010). While the differences between federal and states courts 
are much smaller than those between civilian and military courts, there are still some important 
distinctions that have potential to impact the trial tax. The selection of judges differs between these two 
courts with federal judges being appointed by the President while state court judges can either be 
elected or appointed (“Comparing Federal & State Courts”). Further, federal courts tend to have fewer 
cases than state courts (“Comparing Federal & State Courts”). Most importantly in the context of the 
trial tax, federal courts have the federal sentencing guidelines (Ulmer et al., 2010). 
The federal sentencing guidelines are important in terms of investigating the trial tax for a few 
reasons. The federal sentencing guidelines are the product of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“2018 
Guidelines Manual Annotated”). In order to establish a more consistent and rational sentencing process 
throughout the federal justice system, Congress established the United States Federal Sentencing 
Commission and tasked them to create just sentencing guidelines (“2018 Guidelines Manual 
Annotated”). As a result, once a defendant was convicted of an offense, a small range of sentences was 
given based upon the offense, the offense characteristics, and the defendant’s backgrounds (“2018 
Guidelines Manual Annotated”). From their creation until the Supreme Court decision in United States v. 
Booker in 2005, these “guidelines” were mandatory for judges (Ulmer et al., 2010). Hence, they had to 
choose a sentence within the range prescribed. As detailed later, Booker made these guidelines advisory 
(United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). As a result, the guidelines have been amended, and 
judges must only consider their recommendations rather than impose them.  
Important in the context of trial tax, the federal sentencing guidelines include specific exceptions for 
which a judge may consider lowering the imposed sentence. This includes if the defendant accepts 
 
5 In the 2011 study, Breen includes acquittal data, but the findings referenced are based only on the subsample of 
convicted defendants sentenced to confinement making them accurate measures of trial tax.   
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responsibility for their actions or provides assistance to the government in apprehending and 
prosecuting others (“2018 Guidelines Manual Annotated”). Since these accepted departures more likely 
result after a plea deal than a trial, they may explain some of the trial tax. In fact, Ulmer et al. found that 
these accepted departures explain a significant amount of the trial tax observed in federal courts (2010). 
Despite this, the findings still suggested the existence of a 15% trial tax after accounting for these legally 
accepted departures, implying the disparity comes from more than plea defendants providing 
substantial assistance or accepting responsibility (Ulmer et al. 2010).  
Despite differences in caseloads, judicial selection, and judicial discretion, evidence of a trial tax 
persists in these courts in the literature (Ulmer et al., 2010; Kim, 2015). Similarly, evidence of a trial tax 
is present in this study, which focuses on federal rather than state courts. This study hopes to contribute 
to the discussion on how court characteristics may alter the trial tax by focusing on a less studied court 
type with federal courts. Further, unlike other studies, this study examines an extensive time period 
both before and after the Booker decision to understand how the trial tax may have changed as a result 
of this shift in federal judicial practices. Finally, this study departs from the typical individual level 
analysis of the trial tax, where here we examine whether a trial tax can be observed on a macro level for 
the federal court system. That is, we examine whether circuits with a higher proportion of their cases 
resolved by plea have a lower median sentence length. 
 
V. Data  
 
This macro level analysis uses aggregate data from the United States Sentencing Commission’s 
Federal Sentencing Statistics. Information including number of total cases, number of violent crime 
cases6, proportion of cases resolved by plea, and median sentence length was recorded for each circuit 
(excluding Washington D.C.) for the years 1995-2017. The Washington D.C. circuit was excluded in this 
study because it is believed to differ in important ways from the others. While other circuits are made 
up several different states and/or U.S. territories, the D.C. circuit includes only Washington D.C. Due to 
its smaller size, the D.C. circuit handles much fewer cases per year than any other circuit. For example, 
in 2017, the D.C. circuit had 232 sentencing cases. The circuit with the next lowest number of cases was 
Circuit 1, with 1993 cases—over 8 times the amount observed in the D.C. Circuit. These vast differences 
in size between the circuits means that the median sentence length observed in D.C. is based upon a 
much smaller sample size than that of the other circuits. In addition to this, due to D.C. being the 
nation’s capital, it is likely that the breakdown of crime there is much different than that of other 
circuits. More white-collar crime would be expected in this circuit than others, which may affect the 
median sentence length observed. Due to these differences, this study chose to exclude the D.C. circuit, 
focusing only on the circuits that are made up of multiple states and/or U.S. territories.  
This data provides accurate information on federal sentencing. By law, every federal sentencing 
court is required to submit a detailed document to the USSC within thirty days of making a judgement 
on a case (“Research Notes”).7 Thus, the resulting USSC datafiles represent a census of all federal 
sentences handed down in the U.S. and its territories from 1995 to 2017. This means that this data is 
representative of the population of inference (federal circuit courts), and thus, the results from analysis 
of this data will be reliable in answering the question of existence of a macro level trial tax. In addition 
to the USSC data, information on the number of authorized judgeships in each district from 1995 to 
 
6 For this study, the offenses categorized as violent offenses includes murder, manslaughter, sexual abuse, 
robbery, and assault.   




2017 was collected from the “Additional Authorized Judgeships-Since 1960” PDF file (uscourts.gov) in 
order to calculate the caseload in each circuit.  
 
i. Response Variable 
 
The response variable in this study is Median Sentence Length. This value represents the median 
number of months of incarceration that defendants were sentenced to in a given circuit for a given year. 
For analysis, we considered taking the log of the median sentence length obtained from USSC for each 
circuit-year combination, as this is something commonly done in the literature and recommended by 
many to remedy the skew in the sentence length distributions. However, unlike the distribution of 
individual sentence lengths, the median sentence length distribution does not display a great skew. 
Further, transforming these data with the log function creates heterogeneity in the residuals. Larger log 
median sentence lengths tend to have more variation than smaller log median sentence lengths. This 
violation of the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumptions would unnecessarily complicate inference. The 
residuals resulting from an OLS regression on the raw median sentence lengths do not violate the 
assumption of homoscedasticity. Thus, this raw values method will be used.  
  
ii. Explanatory Variables 
 
The primary variable of interest is the Plea Proportion. This variable is the proportion of cases in a 
circuit for a given year that were resolved by plea. In any circuit in any given year, a vast majority of the 
cases are resolved by plea. Thus, this variable takes on values between .86 and .99 with a majority of the 
observations having between .93 and .97 of their cases resolved through plea. Based on prior research 
suggesting the existence of a trial tax, this study hypothesizes that the proportion of cases resolved by 
plea in a circuit will have a negative relationship with the median sentence length of that circuit. Hence, 
circuits with a higher proportion of their cases resolved by plea will tend to have a lower median 
sentence length while circuits with a lower plea proportion will tend to have a higher median sentence 
length.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Circuits with a lower proportion of their cases resolved by plea will tend to have a 
higher median sentence length than circuits with higher plea proportion resolution tend to after 
controlling for other variables.  
 
Since violent offenses tend to result in harsher punishments, a control variable called Violent 
Offenses will be used. This is a quantitative variable representing the proportion of convicted offenses in 
a circuit for a given year that classify as violent offenses. For the purposes of this study, offenses 
comprising the violent offenses category are murder, manslaughter, sexual abuse, assault, and robbery. 
This definition is adapted from the Uniform Crime Report’s definition of violent crime, which consists of 
murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Since the USSC data does 
not differentiate between manslaughter and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape and sexual abuse, or 
aggravated assault and simple assault, the broader categories were included in the violent crime 
definition of this study. Although this measurement overestimates the true proportion of violent crime 
in a circuit, this measurement will still help control for differences in circuit-years with more serious 
offenses like those included under this variable and with less serious offenses like drug trafficking, arson, 




Due to differences in geography and the population make-up of each circuit, the offense breakdown 
varies from circuit to circuit. For example, 55.5% of the offenses in the 5th Circuit were immigration 
offenses. 8 Meanwhile, only 7.7% of the offenses in the 3rd Circuit were immigration offenses.9 These 
large differences in offense type will likely influence the median sentence length of a given circuit. In 
order to measure these differences, ten indicator variables called “Circuit i” where i ranges from 2 to 11 
will be used. These variables are defined below. Any coefficient other than zero for these variables will 
suggest that that circuit is different from the first circuit in its median sentencing length, and a cross 
coefficient comparison can be made to see if other circuits are significantly different from each other. 
We expect that there will be difference between circuits. More specifically, we predict that Circuit 5 will 
have longer median sentence lengths and Circuit 10 will have shorter median sentence lengths. Circuit 5 
is predicted to have a higher median sentence length because it includes the state of Texas, which is 
notorious for being tough on crime. Circuit 10 is predicted to have shorter median sentence lengths than 
the other circuits because of the border it shares with Mexico and the resulting higher proportion of 
immigration crime in this circuit. 
𝐶𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑖 =  {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝐶𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑖
1 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑖
 
 
Hypothesis 2: There are differences in median sentence length by circuit after controlling for other 
variables. More specifically, Circuit 10 will tend to have a lower median sentence length and Circuit 5 
will tend to have a higher median sentence length. 
 
As mentioned earlier, an important Supreme Court decision was handed down in the U.S. v. Booker 
case in 2005 that changed the structure of sentencing in the federal court system. Prior to this decision, 
the federal sentencing guidelines were mandatory to follow (United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005)). A judge had to select a sentence within the narrow range provided based upon the offense and 
its characteristics as well as the defendant’s background (“2018 Guidelines Manual Annotated”). 
Importantly, the federal sentencing guidelines allowed for judges to weigh their own findings of fact 
against the defendant (United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). These facts did not have to be 
facts found by a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the judge’s finding of an 
aggravating factor like the defendant committing a crime with excessive cruelty was enough for the 
judge to impose a harsher sentence than that dictated by the guidelines (United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005)). In Booker, the Supreme Court questioned the constitutionality of such practices. They 
ruled that allowing a judge to enhance sentences beyond the maximum of the mandatory guideline 
range based upon facts not submitted to and found by the jury or admitted by the defendant 
themselves violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury (United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005)). This is because such finding was based solely on the preponderance of the evidence 
rather than the burden of proof required in criminal law of beyond a reasonable doubt (United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). As a result of this ruling, the federal sentencing guidelines were 
invalidated and ruled unconstitutional (United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). To remedy this, 
the Supreme Court ruled that from that point forward, the guidelines would serve as advisory to judges, 
giving them a basis for their sentencing decisions (United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); “2018 
Guidelines Manual Annotated”).  
This study contains data from before and after this major shift in federal sentencing practices. Thus, 
an indicator variable Year as defined below will be controlled for in the model. Using the focal concerns 
 
8 The 5th Circuit consists of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.  
9 The 3rd Circuit consists of Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands. 
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theory as a framework, this study hypothesizes that the greater discretion allotted to federal judges 
following Booker allows for greater disparity in sentence length depending on the perceived 
blameworthiness of the defendant. Thus, this study hypothesizes that the median sentence lengths for 
the 11 circuits will be significantly different before 2005 and after 2005.  
 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 = {




Hypothesis 3: Booker has had a significant impact on the median sentence length of the circuits.  
 
Prior research suggests that higher caseloads are correlated with a greater trial tax (Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). Focal concerns theory explains that this relationship exists because 
higher caseloads create greater pressure to process cases quickly to keep the system efficient (Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). Thus, there is a heavier reliance on plea deals to resolve cases. 
Additionally, the court actors in these areas will place a greater value on plea deals (Bradley-Engen et al., 
2012; Dixon, 1995; Ulmer et al., 2010). Hence, prosecutors may be more willing to offer a plea discount, 
or judges may be more likely to impose a sentence penalty for those who assert their right to trial. In 
order for this theory to be supported, there should thus be a relationship between a circuit’s caseload 
and plea proportion. More specifically, it would be expected that circuits with greater caseloads should 
also have a longer median sentence lengths. In order to test this theoretical and research-based 
prediction, a separate investigation was done on the relationship between cases resolved by plea in a 
circuit and the caseload of that circuit. The Caseload variable will be plotted against the Plea Proportion 
variable and a loess smoother will be put through this scatterplot to examine its trends. The Caseload 
variable will be a quantitative measure of the number of cases per judge in a given circuit for a given 
year.10  
 
Hypothesis 4: Among the circuits, those with a larger caseload will have a higher proportion of cases 
resolved by plea.  
 
VI. Analysis and Findings  
To begin analysis, a descriptive overview of the data was created. The average median sentence 
length of the federal district courts in the eleven circuits from 1996 to 2017 was about 39 months with a 
standard deviation just over 12 months. The highest median sentence length of 60 months was 
observed during several years in both the fourth and seventh circuit. The lowest median sentence length 
of 3 months was observed in the tenth circuit in 2016. For the independent variable, on average 95.18% 
of cases were resolved by plea in the eleven circuits over the range of years. This variable took on a 
limited range of values with a standard deviation of .0211. Concerning the control variables, each circuit 
had 24 years of observations11  for a total of 264 circuit-years. Further, 121 of these circuit years 
 
10 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 = (
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
) 
11 The data set included information from 1995-2017 for a total of 23 years. However, the year 2004 was split into 
two sets based on the Washington Supreme Court decision in Blakely v. Washington decided this year. 2005 was 
similarly divided into Pre-Booker data and Post-Booker data. Thus, there are 25 total observations per circuit. 
Running a model on these 25 observations showed serial correlation in the residuals. As a result, an additional 
variable for the prior year’s median sentence length for that circuit was included in the regression to reduce the 
autocorrelation.  Since median sentence length predictions for a circuit relied on the previous years’ response 
value, the final model could only include years from 1996-2017. Therefore, there were a total of 24 observations 
per circuit.  
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preceded the Booker decision while 143 followed Booker. The average caseload was 89.31 cases per 
judge per year. However, caseload varied greatly from circuit to circuit and year to year with a standard 
deviation of 47.17 cases. Lastly, on average, 4% of the convicted offenses in the eleven circuits from 
1996-2017 were violent offenses. This control variable had a standard deviation of about .02. Table 1 
below summarizes the descriptive statistics for the data set.  
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Data 
 Coding N % Mean SD 
Dependent Variables      
Median Sentence Length Quantitative Value  
Range: (3,60) 
  39.30 12.65 
      
Independent Variables      
Plea Proportion Quantitative Value 
Range: (0.86,0.99) 
  0.952 0.021 
      
Control Variables      




9.09   
Circuit 3 1 if Circuit 3 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 4 1 if Circuit 4 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 5 1 if Circuit 5 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 6 1 if Circuit 6 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 7 1 if Circuit 7 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 8 1 if Circuit 8 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 9 1 if Circuit 9 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 10 1 if Circuit 10 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Circuit 11 1 if Circuit 11 
0 otherwise 
24 9.09   
Year 1 if after Booker 






Caseload Quantitative Value 
Range: (7,249) 
  89.31 47.17 
Violent Offenses  Quantitative Value 
Range: (0,.15) 
  0.040 0.019 
      
Regress Quantitative Value 
Range: (3,60) 
  39.34 12.28 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the variables of analysis.  
 
Table 3 in Appendix A presents the correlation matrix of all independent and control variables. 
This table provides no evidence of collinearity among the explanatory and control variables. The 
strongest correlation between the explanatory and a control variables is only 0.577 between caseload 
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and plea proportion. This is only a moderate correlation. Additionally, caseload will not be used in a 
model with plea proportion. Caseload will be regressed on plea proportion separately. The strongest 
correlation between the remaining independent and control variables that will be used together in the 
model is even weaker at only -0.475. With no major issues of collinearity, analysis was carried out 
through OLS modelling. 
Looking at Figure 1 of median sentence length by plea proportion, a nonlinear relationship is 
apparent. Thus, nonlinear least squares regression was used to identify a model in R. Originally, the 
median sentence length was regressed on the plea proportion, year, violent offenses and all eleven 
circuit variables. However, the resulting residuals violated the independence assumption, displaying 
positive autocorrelation from year to year within the circuits. Thus, for subsequent analysis a variable 
called Regress that represents the prior year’s median sentence length for that circuit was added. 
Adding the regress variable greatly decreased this autocorrelation, and little evidence remained to 
suggest a lack of independence of the residuals of the other models created from OLS regression. Error 
normality was also assessed along with error homogeneity. Figure 3 in the Appendix B shows no 
evidence of a violation of the homoscedasticity assumption. Further, Figure 4 in the Appendix B shows 
some slight departure from normality. However, t-procedures which are robust to nonnormality, will be 
used for inference. Since there is no evidence of extreme skew or outliers in the model residuals, there 
is no major concern in performing inference based on this model.  
 
 In order to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 simultaneously, the nonlinear least squares function nls  
in R was used to create two models. The results of the regression are shown below in Table 2. In Model 
1, median sentence length was regressed on the plea proportion, violent offenses, year, regress, and all 
circuit variables. In Model 2, median sentence length was regressed on the plea proportion, violent 
offenses, regress, and all circuit variables (so that year was omitted from Model 2).  
Concerning Hypothesis 2, this model provides evidence that the median sentence length does 
differ from circuit to circuit. Circuits 2, 5, 9, and 10 tend to have median sentence lengths below that of 
Circuit 1 after controlling for other variables, while Circuits 4 and 7 tend to have median sentence 
lengths above that of Circuit 1 after controlling for other variables. Model 2 shows similar results 
regarding the circuit variables. Figure 2 gives a side by side comparison of the parameters estimates for 
each circuit.  
Figure 1: This scatterplot 
displays the nonlinear 
relationship between median 
sentence length in months for 
a circuit and the proportion of 




Figure 2: A side by side comparison of parameter estimates by circuits with corresponding standard error 
bars. 
 
Concerning hypothesis 3, Model 1 shows no evidence that the median sentence length changed 
following Booker. With 95% confidence, this study concludes that the median sentence length of the 
eleven circuits following the 2005 Booker decision is between .98 months shorter and 1.22 months 
longer than the median sentence length prior to the Booker decision after accounting for the other 
model variables. Thus, this variable does not significantly add to the existing model. Therefore, this 
variable was excluded from Model 2.  
The exclusion of the Year variable in Model 2, increased the significance of the Violent Offenses 
variable. In Model 1, there was only weak evidence to suggest that the proportion of convicted offenses 
in a circuit that were violent impacted the median sentence length of that circuit. However, by excluding 
the Year variable, this study argues with 95% confidence that an increase of .01 in the proportion of 
violent offenses in a circuit decreases the median sentence length of this circuit between 1.81 days and 
24.71 days. This result is surprising, as it was argued that the proportion of violent offenses should be 
controlled for because the median sentence length would be expected to increase as the proportion of 
violent offenses increased. There is no obvious theoretical explanation as to why this would occur. 
Concerning hypothesis 1, the results suggest that there is a significant relationship between plea 
proportion and median sentence length even after controlling for other variables. Based on the large 
amount of research suggesting the existence of an individual level trial tax, Hypothesis 1 predicted that 
circuits with higher plea proportions would tend to have lower median sentence lengths than circuits 
with lower plea proportions. Model 1 and Model 2’s significant exponential factors support this 
prediction even after accounting for other variables (p<.01). The effect a .01 increase in plea proportion 
has on median sentence length decreases as the size of the plea proportion decreases. In fact, this study 
finds that holding all other variables constant, an increase from 98% of cases resolved by plea to 99% of 
cases resolved by plea in a given circuit would decrease the median sentence length by over 4 months. 
Meanwhile, an increase from 88% of cases resolved by plea to 89% of cases resolved by plea in a given 
circuit holding all other variables constant would decrease the median sentence length by less than a 
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day. Thus, changes in plea proportion of a circuit have more drastic consequences on the median 
sentence length when the plea proportion is relatively high to begin with.  
 
 Model 1  Model 2  






Intercept 18.278 2.514 (13.326, 23.230) 18.346 2.489 (13.443, 23.249) 
Exponential Constant -55.061  18.092 (-90.694, -19.428) -55.031 18.230 (-90.936, -19.125) 
Variables       
Plea Proportion 57.932 18.320 (21.850, 94.014) 57.891 18.460 (21.534, 94.248) 
Circuit 2 -4.309 1.248 (-6.766, -1.852) -4.322 1.244 (-6.772, -1.872) 
Circuit 3 -1.793 1.106 (-3.971, 0.3842) -1.764 1.095 (-3.922, 0.3927) 
Circuit 4 2.954 1.145 (0.6992, 5.210) 2.955 1.143 (0.7042, 5.206) 
Circuit 5 -4.579  1.413 (-7.361, -1.797) -4.628 1.392 (-7.369, -1.889) 
Circuit 6 -0.4873 1.102 (-2.658, 1.683) -0.4646 1.095 (-2.621, 1.692) 
Circuit 7 2.350 1.140 (0.1042, 4.595) 2.376 1.131 (0.1478, 4.604) 
Circuit 8 2.345 1.290 (-0.1954, 4.885) 2.400 1.262 (-0.0851, 4.885) 
Circuit 9 -4.998 1.560 (-8.070, -1.926) -4.985 1.556 (-1.921, -0.0851) 
Circuit 10 -5.911 1.597 (-9.055, -2.766) -5.885 1.589 (-9.014, -2.755) 
Circuit 11 -1.255 1.069 (-3.361, 0.8516) -1.255 1.067 (-3.357, 0.8476) 
Year 0.1206 0.5602 (-0.9828, 1.224)    
Violent Offenses -42.328 21.280 (-84.241, -0.4163) -44.200 19.376 (-82.361, -6.038) 
Regress 0.6616 0.0465 (0.570, 0.753) 0.6628 0.0460 (0.5722, 0.7535) 
Table 2: Nonlinear Model output for Median Sentence Length Regressed on Plea Proportion and control variables.  
 
In order to test Hypothesis 4, Figure 3 was constructed to illustrate the relationship between the 
proportion of cases resolved by plea in a circuit and the caseload of that circuit. The scatterplot displays 
a lack of association between the two variables for caseloads under 50 cases. In fact, when the caseload 
is below 50, there is little to no association between caseload and plea proportion. This lack of 
association is shown by the horizontal loess line across this portion of the graph. A moderate to strong 
positive relationship appears for caseloads greater than 50. This trend does support a focal concerns 
theory. Although low caseloads tend to have little affect on the plea proportion, high caseloads in a 
circuit are associated with a high proportion of cases resolved by plea. This association is not consistent, 
but it does suggest that high caseloads result in increased reliance on plea bargaining and increased 
pressure to plea.  
18 
 
Figure 3: This graph illustrates the relationship between the caseload of a given circuit and the proportion of 




As with all research, this study had some important limitations. First, this study only controlled for a 
few possible variables. The data used did not provide a breakdown of the characteristics of the 
offenders in each circuit. Prior research suggests African Americans, Hispanics, and males tend to face 
longer sentences (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). Additionally, some evidence 
suggests that older convicted offenders tend to receive more lenient sentences (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006), 
and offenders with a longer criminal history tend to receive harsher sentences (Bradley-Engen et al., 
2012; Ulmer et al., 2010). Thus, relationships between high plea proportions and lower median sentence 
lengths may be mediated by the proportion of older offenders or proportion of female offenders in that 
circuit. This study was unable to control for these specific variations that could have created differences 
in the median sentence length. However, the indicator variables for each circuit are designed to help 
control for differences between the eleven circuits. Thus, these indicator variables should be able to 
capture and control for a majority of this variation as long as the characteristics of offenders in a given 
circuit do not vary much from year to year. Second, this research is based on data solely from federal 
courts. Due to important distinctions between different court systems, the results of this study cannot 
be generalized to military courts or state courts such as county or municipal court. Therefore, this study 
is limited in the contributions it can make to the trial tax discussion. Future research should consider 
examining state level courts to see if evidence of a trial tax similarly exists on the macro level. 
Additionally, this would be interesting to investigate in military courts where no evidence of a trial tax 
has been found (Breen, 2011; Breen & Johnson, 2018). Third, the nonlinear nature of this relationship 
made it difficult to test interaction effects among the variables. The focal concerns theory, specifically 
the practical constraints component, suggest that as a court’s caseload increases, the size of the trial tax 
in that court also increases (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006). Much of the prior research has found evidence 
supporting this theory (Ulmer & Bradley, 2006; Ulmer et al., 2010). This study was unable to test for 
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such an interaction effect on the macro level. Future research is encouraged to find ways to investigate 
this interaction effect.  
Despite the limitations of this study, it is able to contribute to the many areas of sentencing 
research. This research provides strong evidence of differences in sentencing between the different 
federal circuits. With 95% confidence this study concludes that Circuit 2 has a median sentence length 
between 1.79 and 6.72 months shorter after accounting for the proportion of cases resolved by plea, 
the proportion of convicted offenses that are violent offenses, and the prior year’s median sentence 
length for that circuit. Similarly, we are 95% confident that Circuit 5 has median sentence lengths 
between 1.92 and 7.48 months shorter. The confidence interval for Circuit 9 is very similar to that of 
Circuit 5. For Circuit 10, we are 95% confident that the median sentence length is between 2.69 and 8.95 
months lower. These differences are likely due to the different types of crime observed in each circuit. In 
fact, Circuits 5, 9, and 10 all share borders with Mexico resulting in higher proportions of immigration 
crime within these circuits compared to others (USSC Federal Sentencing Statistics). The sentences 
imposed for such crimes tend to be less severe than for other crimes. Thus, the higher proportion of 
these crimes in these circuits likely bring down their median sentence lengths. Conversely, Circuits 4 and 
7 tend to have higher median sentence lengths. In fact, we are 95% confident that Circuit 4 has median 
sentence lengths between 1.16 and 5.76 months longer while Circuit 7 has median sentence lengths 
between .57 and 5.08 months longer. There is no apparent explanation as to why these circuits would 
tend to have higher median sentence lengths or Circuit 2 would tend to have a lower median sentence 
length. Overall, this study shows strong evidence that the median sentence length varies from circuit to 
circuit. This variation suggests the necessity of either controlling for circuit or controlling for specific 
circuit characteristics in future research.  
This study also contributes an important finding on the relationship between the violent offenses 
sentence length. Individual level research on this relationship suggests that the more serious/violent the 
convicted offense is, the longer the sentence length (Bradley-Engen et al., 2012; Ulmer et al., 2010). 
Thus, on a macro level it was theorized that a higher proportion of violent crime in a circuit would be 
associated with greater median sentence lengths. However, the findings of this study do not support this 
hypothesis. In fact, the findings of this study suggest the opposite; circuits with a higher proportion of 
violent crime tend to have lower median sentence lengths than circuits with a lower proportion of 
violent crime. While some may dismiss this finding due to the relatively small difference a .01 increase in 
violent crime proportion is expected to make in sentence length, it is important to note that some 
circuits in our data set differ by more than .1 in their violent crime proportion. We are 95% confident 
that differences this large would create differences in average median sentence lengths between 9.31 
days and 8.05 months. Thus, this variable does have important implications for circuits that differ greatly 
in their violent crime proportion. Further, it is important to note that even a ten-day difference in 
median sentence length of a circuit would result in great differences in financial requirements for that 
circuit and great differences in the lives of those incarcerated. Thus, this finding should not be 
considered negligible. In fact, the contradiction between the macro level finding and the individual level 
findings on this relationship is particularly interesting and future research should investigate this further.  
In addition to these contributions, this study adds to the conversation on the effect of Booker. Prior 
research has mixed findings on the impact the Supreme Court decision had on federal sentencing 
practices. Some studies have suggested an increase in sentencing disparity following Booker and 
increased sentencing guidelines departures (Scott, 2009) while others have observed little difference in 
sentencing disparity by regions (Bowman, 2006). More related to this study, prior research suggests no 
differences in the average sentence lengths before and after the Booker decision (Hofer, 2007; Starr & 
Rehavi, 2013). The findings of non-significance in the year variable support these previous findings of no 
change in the median/average sentence lengths. While this study did not test sentencing disparity 
before and after Booker, this relationship could be investigated with a year-circuit interaction variable. 
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Further research should consider this, specifically mimicking Ulmer et al.’s (2010) approach of analyzing 
disparity within the context of designated guideline departures.  
 Most importantly, in line with the focus of this study, these results contribute to the research on 
trial tax. A significant negative exponential relationship is apparent between the proportion of cases 
resolved by plea in a circuit and the median sentence length of that circuit. As a circuit’s plea proportion 
increases, its median sentence length tends to decrease. The rate at which it decreases depends on the 
plea proportion. An increase in the proportion of cases resolved by plea in a circuit that is at the lower 
range of this variable, would tend to result in a smaller decrease in median sentence length than a 
similar increase in plea proportion for a circuit that already has a higher plea proportion. This may be 
due to the relationship observed with caseloads as those with the highest plea proportions were the 
circuits with the highest caseloads. Through a focal concerns framework, these higher caseload circuits 
may impose greater trial penalties to maintain efficiency. Caseload disparity may help mediate the 
exponential nature observed in the trial tax.  
 This study provides evidence of the existence of a trial tax at the macro level. Circuits with lower 
plea proportions tend to have harsher punishments than circuits with higher plea proportions. Thus, 
circuits with a higher proportion of defendants who assert their constitutional right to trial impose 
harsher punishments on their convicted offenders on average. The existence of this relationship despite 
controlling for differences in circuit, year, and proportion of violent crime supports the claim that 




Despite its limitations, this research provides insight into many areas of sentencing research. 
Building upon prior researchers’ investigations into the individual level effect of mode of conviction on 
sentence length, this study finds evidence that circuits with higher plea proportions tend to have higher 
median sentence lengths. This finding is consistent with previous findings that defendants who assert 
their right to trial and are found guilty suffer harsher consequences than those that resolve their cases 
through a guilty or nolo contendere plea. These findings coupled with prior research suggest that the 
American legal system tends to punish those who assert their due process rights. Despite arguments 
that this is necessary in order to preserve efficiency and functionality of the system, this phenomenon 
cannot be condoned. Punishing individuals who assert their Constitutional rights creates pressure on the 
individuals not to do so. Thus, this practice creates a system in which individuals are not truly free and 
willing in their choice to waive trial. Rather, they do so and are advised to do so by their attorneys out of 
fear of receiving harsher sentences. The rights of the Constitution are meant to protect American 
citizens and their liberties. These rights should be respected and safeguarded. If the assertion of such 
rights carries drastic consequences for future liberty, these rights are not being safeguarded as the 
Constitution meant them to be. Further research into this potential violation of Constitutional due 
process rights should be carried out. Importantly, legal scholars should begin brainstorming how to 
abolish the trial tax while maintaining a functional system, whether this means allocating more 
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Figure 4: Residual Plots for Model 1 and Model 2.  
 
Figure 5: Normal quantile plots and residual histograms for Model 1 and Model 2, respectively.  
